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. Robinson LADB News Analyst Late last February, Presidency Minister Antonio Lacayo declared in
a formal ceremony, as he signed demobilization agreements with several groups which had taken
up arms, that armed conflict in Nicaragua was "finally behind us." Just days later, several thousand
men and women belonging to a new armed movement, the "revueltos," made their appearance.
The "revueltos," which means "scrambled" in Spanish, are comprised of former members of the
Nicaraguan Resistance, discharged soldiers of the Sandinista Peoples Army (EPS), and unaffiliated
peasants. The revueltos come together, often spontaneously, to pressure the government into land
redistribution and other economic policies in favor of the rural poor. The "revueltos" made their
debut last March 6, when a group of 1,800 armed men and women took over the city of Ocotal, in
the northern department of Nueva Segovia. Actions continued throughout April and into May,
spreading from the northern mountains to other parts of the country, including agricultural areas
of the central provinces and the densely- populated Pacific seaboard, which had previously not
seen any armed activity. Revuelto protests have involved land invasions, occupation of government
buildings, blocking traffick on the Pan American Highway, and even a brief attempt to interrupt
activities at Puerto Corinto on the Pacific coast. The revueltos have said their objective is not to
provoke the army or to conduct an armed struggle, but to pressure the government into complying
with promises to help resolve the desperate social and economic situation of the rural poor. From
recontras and recompas to revueltos Two years after President Violeta Chamorro's administration
took over from the Sandinistas, the specter of military conflict continues to hang over Nicaragua.
This time, however, the conflict has taken on novel dimensions. Earlier political animosities
between the Sandinistas and contras have been largely overcome. The loosely-organized revuelto
phenomenon is not ideologically motivated. It does not constitute a organized movement in
itself. Rather, it is part of the emergence of a unified movement of rural poor, or an organized
peasantry with collective socio-economic demands and an increasing class consciousness. The
decade-long war between the Sandinistas and the contras was officially concluded on June 27,
1990, when some 22,500 members of the Nicaraguan Resistance demobilized under the supervision
of international peacekeeping forces, after several months of negotiations with the incoming
Chamorro administration. By fall 1990, however, thousands of demobilized contras had again
taken up arms. Dubbed "recontras," the new armed groups were clearly heterogenous, reflecting
the complexities of the post-electoral transition and the legacy of a decade of political hostilities.
Many pressed for the government to comply with its promises to supply land, production credit,
agricultural inputs and social services so that the demobilized contras could become productive
civilians. But others, in alliance with far right groups, raised political demands, such as the removal
of specific government officials, the abolition of the EPS, and even the prohibition of activities by
the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Some pressed purely personal demands, such
as appointment to ministerial posts and monetary compensation. These groups often resorted to
rural terrorism, including theft, kidnapping, and murder, particularly of Sandinista sympathizers.
Meanwhile, with the war over, the EPS was reduced from over 80,000 to just 20,000 troops. Many
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of the discharged soldiers, often of peasant origin, suddenly found themselves unemployed,
landless, and in the same penurious conditions as the demobilized contras. Soon, the "recompas,"
or former EPS troops who took up arms on their own, made an appearance, in part as "selfdefense" against the recontras, and in part to pressure the government into providing the same
amenities (land, inputs, loans) as the former contras were demanding. According to data from the
Nicaraguan Agrarian Reform Institute, only about 20% of all demobilized contras and discharged
EPS soldiers had actually received land by early 1992. In late February, after months of negotiations,
the government reached a formal disarmament agreement with about 14,000 recontras and
recompas. Authorities collected their weapons in exchange for cash payments and promises to
deliver land, inputs and production loans without further delay. Barely a week later, the "revueltos"
made their appearance in Ocotal. On April 20, they announced the creation of two national fronts,
the National Self-Defense Armed Movement (MADNA) and the Democratic Forces of National
Salvation (FDSN). New panorama in Nicaragua The appearance of the revueltos underscores
just how much Nicaragua's political, military and socio-economic panorama has changed in the
past two years. Contras and Sandinistas in the countryside, once mortal enemies, are now united,
without any ideological pretensions, around the common class interests of the peasantry. With most
of the original Resistance commanders bought off with money and land, and the top EPS brass
still in the army, the revueltos are foot soldiers of the two armies who have been left to fend for
themselves, and have little to lose. The revueltos have clearly won sympathy, if not support, from
a portion of the civilian population residing where they operate. In fact, many of the actions were
started by bands of revueltos but quickly incorporated unarmed landless peasants and sympathetic
civilians. The revueltos have emerged simultaneous to the creation of the National Campesino
Coordinating Committee (CNC). The CNC brings together peasants from across the political
spectrum, including members of the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG-generally
considered of Sandinista orientation), former contra sympathizers, and unaffiliated peasants.
Such a nation-wide, united peasant movement is unprecedented in Nicaraguan history. The CNC
has participated in several revuelto protests, and abstained from others result of disagreement
over violent tactics, spontaneous land takeovers and "unorderly methods of struggle." Revueltos,
CNC members, and unaffiliated peasants have been meeting in different parts of the country and
announcing "Operational Plans for Campesino Unity." Meanwhile, the EPS is increasingly losing
an FSLN party orientation, opting to respond to the government's interests. In April, the EPS used
military force for the first time to defend private property in two separate instances. First, army
units violently dislodged a coalition of workers and revueltos who had occupied the Sebacco agroindustrial complex outside of Esteli, which is slated for privatization. A few weeks later, EPS troops
were ordered to protect banana plantations in the northwest province of Chinandega that had
been occupied by revueltos and unarmed landless peasants from the area. The banana plantations
belonged mostly to members of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), a powerful,
right-wing association of private businesspeople. FSLN leaders have tried to negotiate between
the government and the revueltos, yet the Sandinistas have also publicly come out in support of
revuelto demands. Former president Daniel Ortega successfully mediated the first revuelto action
in Esteli. "The role of Sandinismo in all this to promote reconciliation," claimed Ortega, adding that
he himself was "a partisan mediator" (sic). Ortega has called for the government to immediately
invest US$20 million in providing land and housing to meet demands of the rural poor. Legacy of
revolution and consequence of neo-liberalism The newfound assertiveness and class consciousness
of the Nicaraguan peasantry is a legacy of the high levels of social mobilization among all sectors
of society achieved during the Sandinista revolution, and a new set of social values inherited from
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the revolution, such as the legitimacy of the demands of the poor. Yet the persistence of armed
movements is also a legacy of 10 years of war, in which addressing social problems through military
action, particularly in the countryside, has become routine. The revuelto phenomenon has been
fueled by an estimated 60,000 weapons still in the hands of demobilized contras and former EPS
soldiers. The government set up Special Disarmament Brigades late last year to collect weapons
from civilians through a "voluntary disarmament program." In the first two stages of the program,
about 40,000 weapons were collected. In the third stage of the program, initiated in mid-April,
the government hopes to collect another 30,000. For many Nicaraguans, however, the underlying
cause of the revuelto phenomenon is the Chamorro government's neo-liberal economic program.
This program, now in its third year, has achieved financial stability at a devastating social cost. An
estimated 700,000 people are unemployed in a labor force of 1.3 million. Over 70% of the population
is now below the official poverty line. Health, education and other social services have been cut
back, wages reduced, and production credit restricted, in order to reduce the fiscal deficit and
meet other conditions imposed by foreign donors and creditors. Polarization and social crisis are
particularly severe in the countryside, where a drought, low agricultural prices, landlessness and
insecurity over land tenure have aggravated the situation. Mass starvation and disease epidemics
have begun to appear in Nueva Segovia and other areas. According to Ortega, the revuelto actions
are "the first organized political sign of a social explosion" in the country that could "provoke a
political and institutional crisis," and thus destabilize the government. UNAG president Daniel
Nunez recently warned that a new civil war could break out if the social crisis in countryside is not
resolved.
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